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MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY SWITCHING
TROY DAVIG, ERIC M. LEEPER, AND HESS CHUNG
Abstract. Interest rate rules for monetary policy and tax rules for ﬁscal policy
change stochastically between two regimes. In the ﬁrst regime monetary policy
follows the Taylor principle and taxes rise strongly with increases in the real value
of government debt; in the second regime the Taylor principle fails to hold and taxes
follow an exogenous stochastic process.
Because agents’ decision rules embed the probability that policies will change
qualitatively in the future, monetary and tax shocks always produce wealth eﬀects,
breaking down Ricardian Equivalence. The impacts of monetary policy shocks can
also be diﬀerent because their ﬁscal implications (and wealth eﬀects) are diﬀerent
when regime can change. If monetary policy adjusts the interest rate at all in
response to inﬂation, then i.i.d. policy shocks propagate for many periods.
The paper also addresses two empirical issues. First the “price puzzle” that
plagues monetary VARs is a natural outcome of periods when monetary policy fails
to obey the Taylor principle and taxes do not respond to the state of government in-
debtedness. Second, dynamic correlations between ﬁscal surpluses and government
liabilities, which have been interpreted as consistent with Ricardian Equivalence,
can be produced by an underlying equilibrium that is non-Ricardian.
1. Introduction
Two themes run through policy analysis: rules determining policy choice are func-
tions of economic conditions; those rules may change over time. Those themes reﬂect
the common view that actual policy behavior is purposeful, rather than arbitrary,
and that good policy adapts to changes in the structure of the economy or to im-
provements in understanding of how policy aﬀects the economy.
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A growing body of work estimates policy rules over diﬀerent time periods to ﬁnd
that critical parameters have changed in important ways over time.
1 Those parame-
ters are critical because in simple theoretical models they can determine existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium. In light of this evidence, there has been surprisingly little
formal modeling of environments where regime change is stochastic and the objects
subject to change are parameters determining how the economy feeds back to policy
choice.
This paper allows interest rate rules for monetary policy and tax rules for ﬁscal
policy to change stochastically between two regimes. In the ﬁrst regime monetary
policy follows the Taylor (1993) principle and taxes rise strongly with increases in the
real value of government debt; in the second regime the Taylor principle fails to hold
and taxes follow an exogenous stochastic process.
We are driven to model regime switching by our reading of American macro policies
since World War II. Before describing the paper’s results, it is useful to review the
h i s t o r yo fm o n e t a r ya n dt a xp o l i c yb e h a v i o r .
1.1. A Quick Post-WW II History of Regime Change. There is a near consen-
sus among macroeconomists that U.S. monetary policy changed regime in late 1979.
The consensus view holds that monetary policy changed from a period where in-
creases in inﬂation were passively accommodated to one where incipient inﬂation was
actively combatted with tighter policy.
2 Taylor (1999a), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000), and Lubik and Schorfheide (2003b), among others, found that from 1960-
1979 the Fed followed an interest rate rule that failed to satisfy the Taylor principle,
which requires adjusting the Federal funds rate more than one-for-one in response to
inﬂation. Since the early 1980s, the Taylor principle is satisﬁed, according to this
empirical work.
Less well appreciated is the fact that ﬁscal policy may also have experienced changes
in regime.
3 In some periods, taxes are adjusted passively in response to changing
debt levels; at other times, tax changes are active attempts to achieve non-budgetary
macroeconomic goals.
1For example, see Taylor (1999a) or Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) for estimates of monetary
policy rules and Taylor (2000) or Auerbach (2002) for estimates of tax policy rules. Favero and
Monacelli (2003) explicitly model regime switching in their estimates of monetary and tax policy
rules.
2But see Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Sims and Zha (2002), and Hanson (2003) for alternative
viewpoints.
3This paragraph and the next draw on Pechman (1987), Poterba (1994), Stein (1996), Steuerle
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The history of tax policy illustrates the pendulum swings in policy. In the 1950s
taxes were increased three times on the grounds of budget balancing, in large part
to ﬁnance the Korean War. By the 1960s, with the rise of Keynesian macro policies,
tax changes were initiated primarily as a countercyclical tool. Budget balance had
slipped into the background of tax debates. This trend continued into the 1970s,
with Presidents Ford and Carter proposing tax cuts designed to stimulate economic
activity. Reagan’s Economic Recovery Plan drastically cut individual and corporate
income tax rates from levels that were thought to be adversely aﬀecting incentives.
The resulting explosion in Federal government debt and its associated interest pay-
ments shifted priorities once again toward budget balancing, and in 1982, 1984, 1990,
and 1993 Reagan, Bush, and Clinton signed legislation that raised taxes to reduce
budget deﬁcits. During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush ran on a
plank that taxes should be cut “to return the budget surplus to the people.” By the
time Bush’s campaign pledge was ratiﬁed by Congress in 2001, the rationale for tax
reduction had shifted once again–this time from budget concerns to economic stimu-
lus. The last two tax reductions, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act (2002)
and the Growth and Jobs Act (2003), were unambiguously motivated by countercycli-
cal objectives. Evidently over the past 50 years ﬁscal policy behavior has ﬂuctuated
between periods when taxes were adjusted in response to the state of government
indebtedness and those when other priorities drove tax decisions.
1.2. What We Do. Against this history of shifts in policy rules, we use a very
simple model as a ﬁrst step toward examining the implications of the kinds of regime
changes that the United States has actually experienced. The stark model highlights
mechanisms that arise from regime switching but will continue to be present in richer
models where the mechanisms are harder to isolate.
Because agents’ decision rules embed the probability that policies will change qual-
itatively in the future, monetary and tax shocks always produce wealth eﬀects. Re-
gardless of the prevailing regime, agents never expect the changes in debt that policy
disturbances induce to generate oﬀsetting changes in future taxes. Those wealth ef-
fects mean that taxes always matter for aggregate demand and Ricardian Equivalence
breaks down. The impacts of monetary policy shocks can also be diﬀerent because
their ﬁscal implications (and wealth eﬀects) are diﬀerent when regime can change.
4
We also show that if monetary policy adjusts the interest rate at all in response to
inﬂation, then i.i.d. policy shocks propagate for many periods, creating serial corre-
lation in inﬂation and nominal interest rates.
4The ﬁscal consequences of monetary policy are stressed in the optimal policy work of Benigno
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The paper uses simulated time series from the model to address two empirical
issues. First, the “price puzzle” that plagues monetary VARs is a natural outcome
of periods when monetary policy fails to obey the Taylor principle and taxes do
not respond to the state of government indebtedness. Second, dynamic correlations
between ﬁscal surpluses and government liabilities, which have been interpreted as
consistent with Ricardian Equivalence, can be produced by an underlying equilibrium
that is non-Ricardian.
This pattern of results raises two questions. Is Ricardian equivalence a useful
benchmark for the study of tax policy? Can we rely on the Taylor principle to insult
the economy from the inﬂationary consequences of ﬁscal policy?
2. Contacts with the Literature
This paper makes contact with existing work in several areas. Sargent and Wallace
(1981) were among the ﬁrst to emphasize intertemporal aspects of monetary and ﬁscal
policy interactions. With monetary and ﬁscal policy, there are two policy authorities
that jointly determine the price level and ensure the government is solvent. When
one policy authority pursues its objective unconstrained by the behavior of the other
authority, its behavior is “active,” whereas the constrained authority’s behavior is
“passive.”5
If policy regime is ﬁxed, active monetary policy coupled with passive ﬁscal policy–
the policy mix implicit in the literature on the Taylor principle–produces monetarist
and Ricardian predictions of monetary and ﬁscal policy impacts. In contrast, when
active ﬁscal policy combines with passive monetary policy–the combination associ-
ated with the ﬁscal theory of the price level
6–monetary and tax changes generate
wealth eﬀects that shift aggregate demand, and policy impacts are non-monetarist
and non-Ricardian.
Lucas (1976) taught macroeconomists to think about policy changes in terms of
shifts in regime. But Lucas’s examples all involve once-and-for-all changes, rather
than the on-going process described in the quick history above. Cooley, LeRoy, and
Raymon (1982, 1984), among others, have argued that treating policy as making
once-and-for-all choices is logically inconsistent. After all, if policy authorities can
contemplate changing regime, then regime is not permanent. If there has been a
history of changes in monetary and ﬁscal policy regimes, private agents will ascribe
a probability distribution over policy regimes. Agents’ expectations, and therefore
their decision rules, will reﬂect their belief that policy changes are not once-and-for-
all. This point resonates especially crisply in the United States, where the policy
5This follows Leeper’s (1991) taxonomy.
6See, for example, Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995), and Cochrane (1999).POLICY SWITCHING 5
changes we aim to model are intrinsically temporary; they arose largely because of
the personalities of the political players, rather than through the creation of new
policy institutions or changes in existing institutions’ legal mandates.
A growing number of empirical studies ﬁnds evidence of regime changes. Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000) ﬁnd that from 1960-1979 the Taylor principle does not hold
for U.S. monetary policy. They implicitly assume that ﬁscal policy was passive during
this period, allowing for multiple equilibria, and they interpret the inﬂation of the
1970s as arising from self-fulﬁlling sunspot equilibria. Woodford (1999) suggests that
ﬁscal policy may have been active during that period, implying that observed inﬂation
emerged from a unique equilibrium. Favero and Monacelli (2003) and Sala (2003) oﬀer
empirical evidence that ﬁscal policy was active and monetary policy was passive in
the 1960s and 1970s, supporting Woodford’s argument.
All this work is couched in terms of changes in policy regime, and there have been
some eﬀorts to incorporate switching policy speciﬁcations into dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models to study the ﬁscal theory of price level determi-
nation (FTPL) [for example, Sims (1997), Woodford (1998), Loyo (1999), Mackowiak
(2002), Weil (2003), and Daniel (2003)]. But each of these papers considers only
one-time changes in regime. In addition, Loyo (1999), Weil (2003), and Daniel (2003)
consider only changes in ﬁscal regime, holding monetary policy behavior ﬁxed. Given
a history of both monetary and ﬁscal regime switching, it is important to allow both
policies to change. This paper generalizes the theoretical literature on monetary and
ﬁscal policy interactions by explicitly modeling regime change as an on-going process.
Both one-time changes in regime and changes in only ﬁscal or monetary policy be-
havior are special cases of our speciﬁcation.
There is work that models on-going regime change [for example, Andolfatto and
Gomme (2003), Davig (2002, 2003b), Leeper and Zha (2002), Schorfheide (2003),
and Andolfatto, Hendry, and Moran (2002)]. That work considers only exogenous
processes for policy variables that switch regime. This paper makes substantive and
technical contributions by extending work on on-going regime change to allow the
objects subject to change to be parameters that determine how the economy feeds
back to policy choice. This is the ﬁrst example of which we are aware that allows for
regime switching in parameters of endogenous policy rules in a DSGE model, where
the parameters determine existence and uniqueness.
Empirical ﬁndings that policy regimes have changed in important ways are diﬃ-
cult to interpret without theory that models regime changes explicitly [Favero and
Monacelli (2003) and Sala (2003)]. This paper ﬁlls some of the theoretical holes.
Finally, the paper connects to two bodies of empirical work. It oﬀers an interpre-
tation of the price puzzle in monetary VARs that diﬀers from the cost channel putPOLICY SWITCHING 6
forth by Barth and Ramey (2001) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001).
The paper also provides a counterexample to the empirical inferences drawn by Bohn
(1998) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) about the behavior of ﬁscal policy in
the United States.
3. The Model
The model is an endowment version of Sidrauski (1967), modiﬁed to include an
interest rate rule for monetary policy and a tax rule for ﬁscal policy.
3.1. Households. The representative consumer receives a constant endowment each
period, yt = y, of which a constant gt = g is consumed by the government. Agents
choose consumption, ct, and decide how to allocate portfolio holdings between values














where 0 <β<1 is the discount rate, δ>0,R t−1 is the one-period return on nominal
bonds, τt is lump-sum taxes, and πt = Pt/Pt−1. The household takes initial nominal
assets as given: M−1 > 0,R −1B−1 > 0. Expectations at date t are taken with respect
to an information set that contains all variables dated t and earlier. Policy is the sole
source of uncertainty, as detailed below.
In equilibrium, ct = c = y−g and the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions corresponding















The optimal paths for real balances and bonds must also satisfy their respective
transversality conditions.
3.2. Policy Speciﬁcation. The ﬁxed-regime model corresponds to Leeper (1991),
where the properties of the rational expectations equilibrium depend on the reaction
coeﬃcients in the monetary and ﬁscal policy rules. The ﬁxed-regime rules are
Rt = α0 + απt + θt, (5)POLICY SWITCHING 7
τt = γ0 + γbt−1 + ψt, (6)
where θt and ψt are i.i.d. shocks to monetary and tax policies.
We choose these policy rules to connect this paper to existing work. In this economy
with perpetually full employment, an interest rate rule for monetary policy is clearly
not optimal. If anything, it will reduce private welfare. We employ speciﬁcation (5)
for two reasons. First, it closely resembles monetary policy rules that have received
detailed study in recent years [for example, Taylor (1999b)]. Second, (5) produces
features of an equilibrium that will continue to hold in models with frictions where
rules from the general class to which (5) belongs are optimal. The form of the tax
rule, (6), is also widely used in both model simulations [Bryant, Hooper, and Mann
(1993)] and in analytical studies of monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions [Leeper
(1991), Sims (1997), or Woodford (2003)].
A combination of lump-sum taxes, new one-period nominal bonds and money cre-
ation ﬁnance government purchases and debt payments. The government’s ﬂow bud-
get identity holds at each date t ≥ 0:
Bt + Mt
Pt




given initial nominal liabilities M−1 > 0,R −1B−1 > 0.7
In a linear approximation to the model, a monetary authority reacting aggressively
to inﬂation, |αβ| > 1,a n daﬁscal authority raising taxes suﬃciently to cover interest





¯ < 1, implies a unique equilibrium
consistent with Ricardian equivalence.8 This policy combination is referred to as
active monetary and passive ﬁscal policy (AM/PF). A monetary authority reacting
weakly to inﬂation, |αβ| < 1,a n daﬁscal authority reacting weakly to real debt, ¯ ¯β
−1 − γ
¯ ¯ > 1, implies a unique equilibrium where the path of taxes aﬀects the
inﬂation rate. This policy combination is referred to as passive monetary and active
ﬁscal policy (PM/AF). One version of the ﬁscal theory of the price level emerges as
the special case α = γ =0 .
7By assuming initial government debt is positive, we do not address the criticism that the FTPL
falls apart when B−1 =0 . The criticism is made in a perfect foresight model by Niepelt (2001) and
countered in a stochastic model with incomplete markets by Daniel (2003).
8Logarithmic preferences make money essential and eliminate Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s (1983) spec-
ulative hyperinﬂations as potential equilibria. This allows the Taylor principle, coupled with passive
tax policy, to deliver uniqueness. As Sims (1997) shows, if money is inessential, this policy mix does
not produce a determinant equilibrium.POLICY SWITCHING 8
The policy speciﬁcation for the regime-switching model allows the coeﬃcients in
the tax and interest rate rules to depend on an observed state variable. The regime-
switching policy rules are
Rt = α0(St)+α1(St)πt + θt, (8)
τt = γ0(St)+γ1(St)bt−1 + ψt, (9)
where St ∈ {1,2},θ t ∼ N(0,σ 2
θ) and ψt ∼ N(0,σ2
ψ). The reaction coeﬃcients take a
diﬀerent value depending on the state variable,
γi (St)=
½
γi(1) for St =1
γi(2) for St =2
, for i = {0,1}, (10)
αj (St)=
½
αj(1) for St =1
αj(2) for St =2
, for j = {0,1}. (11)
We use the local results from the linearized (ﬁxed-regime) model to guide para-
meter choices for the non-linear switching model. For most of this paper regime 1






¯ < 1. Regime 2 combines passive monetary policy with active ﬁscal
policy (PM/AF): |α1(2)β| < 1 and
¯ ¯β
−1 − γ1(2)
¯ ¯ > 1.
Regimes follow a two-state Markov chain governed by the transition matrix
Π =
·
p11 1 − p11
1 − p22 p22
¸
, (12)
P [St = j|St−1 = i]=pij, where i,j =1 ,2
and p12 ≡ 1 − p11 and p21 ≡ 1 − p22.
We assume agents observe current and past realizations of regimes and of exogenous
disturbances.
Although our reading of macro policy history and Favero and Monacelli’s (2003)
estimates suggest that monetary and ﬁscal policy have not switched synchronously, for
two reasons we assume that they do through most of the paper. First, it is a reasonable
ﬁrst step toward understanding the implications of regime switching. Second, full non-
synchronous switching would allow the economy to evolve for a time under policies
that are both passive. A PM/PF mix, if it were expected to last forever, yields
indeterminacy of equilibrium. We postpone grappling with the numerical aspects of
indeterminacies and sunspots in non-linear models to later work. Section 6, however,
displays an example of non-synchronous switching in a case where the equilibrium is
unique.POLICY SWITCHING 9
3.3. Competitive Equilibrium. The equilibrium for the economy with regime-
switching policy rules is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1. Given the state vector Φt = {wt−1,b t−1,θ t,ψt,S t}, where wt−1 =
Rt−1bt−1 + mt−1, a competitive equilibrium for the economy consists of a con-
tinuous decision rule for real debt, bt = hb (Φt), and a continuous pricing function,
πt = hπ (Φt), such that
(1) taking sequences {Rt,τt,πt,θ t,ψ t,S t} as given, the representative agent’s op-
timization problem is solved;
(2) the ﬁscal authority sets τt according to (8) and the monetary authority sets Rt
according to (9);
(3) the government budget identity, (7), and the aggregate resource constraint,
yt = ct + gt, are satisﬁed.
With a ﬁxed endowment of goods each period, it is not feasible for the real value
of government debt to grow without bound even though in a growing economy debt
can expand at a rate less than the real interest rate without violating the agents’
transversality condition for debt. Hence, in a deterministic steady state, all real
values of variables, the nominal interest rate, and the inﬂation rate are constant.
4. A Benchmark Specification
It may seem natural to solve the model by ﬁrst linearizing around the regime-
dependent steady states. But in the switching model, policy parameters as well as
policy shocks are random variables. For some policies of interest it can turn out that
the one-step-ahead forecast error in inﬂation from the Fisher relation is correlated with
future policy parameters. Linear methods fail to capture this correlation, leading
the approximations to incorrectly classify existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
Appendices A-C show this in detail for two diﬀerent linearization methods. Appendix
D describes the numerical procedure for solving the non-linear switching model. In
all the results reported, we conﬁrm local uniqueness of decision rules by randomly
perturbing the converged rules and checking that the algorithm recovers those original
decisions.
This section describes results from a benchmark speciﬁcation that is designed to
build intuition about the nature of the switching equilibrium. The section also con-
trasts the results with predictions from the model with ﬁxed policy regime.
4.1. Parameter Selections. Our objective is to obtain qualitative, rather than
quantitative, implications from the model, and the parameter values were chosen
with that aim in mind. Several parameter choices were based on their implicationsPOLICY SWITCHING 10
for the model’s deterministic steady state, which we set equal across regimes.9 We
take the model to be at an annual frequency, so we set β = .9615, implying a 4
percent real interest rate. Output is normalized to 1 and government consumption
is 25 percent of GDP. The debt-output ratio is .4 and inﬂation is 3 percent in the
deterministic steady state; both numbers are in the ballpark for post-war U.S. data.
In choosing the weight on real money balances in preferences, δ, we sought to make
the model’s consumption velocity close to U.S. data.10 This implied δ = .0296.
The feedback parameters in the policy rules, (α1(St),γ1(St)), were chosen to cor-
respond to values used in the literature. In regime 1–active monetary policy and
passive ﬁscal policy–α1(1) = 1.5, a common value in the Taylor rule literature, and
γ1(1) = .275, implying a very strong response of taxes to debt. In regime 2–passive
monetary policy and active ﬁs c a lp o l i c y – w ec h o s et h er u l e sm o s to f t e na n a l y z e di n
the FTPL literature: α1(2) = 0 and γ1(2) = 0, making both the nominal interest rate
and taxes exogenous.
Given the settings for (α1(St),γ1(St)) and the assumptions on the deterministic
steady state values for debt and inﬂation, the intercept terms for the policy rules,
(α0(St),γ0(St)), are determined.
For the benchmark speciﬁcation, we make the transition probabilities between
regimes equal, with the regimes only moderately persistent. With p11 = p22 = .85, the
average regime duration is 6-2/3 years. This duration is briefer than seems plausible,
but it makes the diﬀerences between regimes clear.11
The variances of the i.i.d. policy shocks, (θt,ψ t), are ﬁxed across regimes. We set
σ2
θ =3 .125e−6 and σ2
ψ =2 .05e−5.12 A constant σ2
ψ implies the same-sized tax shock
in each regime: two standard deviations amount to a change in taxes relative to its
stationary mean of about 3-1/2 percent. Because of simultaneity between Rt and πt
in the monetary policy rule, a constant σ2
θ can imply very diﬀerent changes in the
nominal interest rate and inﬂation from a given shock. In the benchmark model, a
two standard-deviation shock to θt lowers Rt 5 basis points in regime 1 and 35 basis
points in regime 2.
9Of course, in the stochastic regime-switching model, the higher moments that matter for expected
inﬂation can vary across regime. Consequently, the means of the stationary distribution conditional
on either regime will not match their deterministic steady state counterparts.
10The average ratio of consumption of non-durables plus services to the real monetary base over
1959-2002 is about 2.4.
11In section 5 we examine the equilibrium’s sensitivity to variation in policy settings, including
feedback parameters and regime duration.
12For present purposes ﬁxing variances across regime is unobjectionable, but for matching data it
may be a problem, as the work by Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Sims (1999), Sims and Zha (2002),
Hanson (2003), and Favero and Monacelli (2003) suggests.POLICY SWITCHING 11
4.2. Non-linear Impulse Response Analysis. The methods of Gallant, Rossi,
and Tauchen (1993) are used to assess the dynamic impacts of shocks to ﬁscal and
monetary policy. Impulse response functions reported below contrast the conditional
mean proﬁle of a series to a baseline proﬁle. A regime-dependent steady state is
deﬁned as follows.




, is values for the








and St−1 = St = j,where j = {1,2}.
For example, the impact eﬀect of an i.i.d shock to lump-sum taxes on inﬂation
conditioning on an AM/PF policy (regime 1) is described by









where hπ ¡¯ Φ
¢
is the regime-dependent steady state value for inﬂation. The paths for
inﬂation and debt are then recursively updated, holding regime constant. The non-
linear impulse response is the conditional path less the baseline path. The impulse
response analysis that follows uses derivations analogous to (13) to trace out the
impacts of perturbing on shock, holding all other sources of randomness ﬁxed.
4.3. Average versus Marginal Sources of Financing. This paper follows Sargent
and Wallace (1981) by emphasizing the ﬁscal ﬁnancing consequences of alternative
monetary and tax policy rules. We wish to highlight a distinction that does not
appear in Sargent and Wallace: there can be an important diﬀerence between the
average and the marginal source of ﬁnancing.13 In the model’s deterministic steady
state direct taxation through τ constitutes over 96 percent of total revenues, leaving
seigniorage to cover a little over 3 percent. Although the means of the stochastic
steady states across regimes diﬀer slightly from the deterministic steady state values,
the message is the same: on average seigniorage is a trivial source of ﬁscal ﬁnancing.
In regime 1 (AM/PF), seigniorage averages about 3.6 percent of total revenues (.99
percent of output), and in regime 2 it averages 3.4 percent (.95 percent of output).
These numbers are consistent with the evidence King (1995) cites.
13This distinction is sometimes overlooked. King and Plosser (1985), for example, point to the
fact that averaged across time inﬂation ﬁnancing is a trivial source of revenues in the United States
as suggesting that inﬂation taxes should also be inconsequential in response to various shocks to
the economy. In addition, many observers dispute the relevance of the dynamic policy interactions
that Sargent and Wallace describe on the grounds that over time most developed countries do not
rely heavily on seigniorage revenues [King (1995)]. Castro, Resende, and Ruge-Murcia (2003) draw
a similar conclusion for OECD countries.POLICY SWITCHING 12
There are three distinct marginal sources of ﬁnancing that exogenous disturbances
may generate. The ﬁrst arises from an instantaneous jump in the price level that
revalues existing nominal government liabilities. The other two sources are dynamic,
arising from changes in the present values of the primary surplus and seigniorage.
































The government’s present value budget identity implies
Bt
Pt
= xt + zt. (16)
After taking expectations at date t of both sides of 16, Cochrane (2001b) refers to
this relationship as a “debt valuation equation,” which he uses to exposit the FTPL.
When expected xt and zt are ﬁx e db yp o l i c yb e h a v i o r ,ab o n d - ﬁnanced tax cut must
make Pt jump to ensure the equilibrium value of debt does not change. This is the
instantaneous marginal source of ﬁnancing.
Under diﬀerent policy assumptions, exogenous shocks may bring forth expected
changes in xt or zt. Given the benchmark parameters, when regimes are permanent,
i.i.d. shocks to taxes and to monetary policy generate no change in the present value of
seigniorage in regime 1 (AM/PF), though they do aﬀect the present value of surpluses.
Tax shocks in regime 2 (PM/AF) leave both xt and zt unchanged, while monetary
policy shocks change both xt and zt. In contrast, in the switching model only tax
disturbances in regime 2 leave the present values in (14) and (15) unchanged.14
4.4. Impacts of Policy Shocks in Regime 1 (AM/FP). To isolate the impacts
of ﬁscal and monetary policy shocks, we condition on regime, start the economy at
its steady state for that regime, perturb either ψt or θt, and compute the change
in the decision rules and the resulting changes in path of variables, as indicated in
(13). Regime is held ﬁxed in this experiment. The impacts are reported in ﬁgures 1
(conditioning on regime 1) and 5 (conditioning on regime 2); solid lines are responses
to an i.i.d. tax cut and dashed lines are responses to an i.i.d. monetary easing.
14If regime 2 set γ1(2) > 0 but small and 0 <α 1(2) < 1, both present values would change.POLICY SWITCHING 13
4.4.1. Tax Shocks. Regime 1 ﬁscal policy would be Ricardian if policy regime were
expected to last forever. A bond-ﬁnanced tax cut brings forth an expectation of future
taxes whose present value exactly equals the increase in the value of debt. With no
change in net wealth, demand for goods is unchanged at initial prices and interest
rates. Unchanged inﬂation implies unchanged nominal rates, leaving the present value
of seigniorage also unchanged.
When regime can change, agents treat a tax cut as an increase in wealth because
t h e yp l a c ep o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t yo ns w i t c h i n gt or e g i m e2( P M / A F ) ,w h e r et a x e sa r e
exogenous. A switch to regime 2 with ﬁxed taxes brings with it a discrete devaluation
of government debt through an increase in the price level. Higher wealth increases
aggregate demand and the current inﬂation rate in this economy with a ﬁxed supply
of goods [ﬁgure 1].15
With α1(1) = 1.5 in regime 1, monetary policy reacts to the higher inﬂation rate by
sharply raising the nominal interest rate. This creates an expectation that inﬂation
will remain above its stationary level in regime 1, which is consistent with the antic-
ipated debt devaluation. With the impulse response functions conditional on regime
1, active monetary policy propagates the transitory tax cut, generating persistently
higher inﬂation and nominal rates. The persistence is so strong that variables remain
away from their pre-shock levels over 10 periods after the tax cut.
In periods following the tax cut, taxes increase in a manner suggestive of Ricardian
ﬁscal behavior, as regime 1 policy passively raises taxes when debt increases. But
the rise in the value of debt exceeds the present value of these tax increases, with the
diﬀerence made up by an increase in the present value of inﬂation taxes.
Decision rules in the switching environment diﬀer markedly from the rules when
regime is ﬁxed. Figure 2 shows the equilibrium rules for bt and πt under AM/PF
policies for both ﬁxed and switching regime models. The rules are expressed as
functions of ψt and θt, holding all other state variables at their regime-dependent
steady state values. The lower left panel of the ﬁgure illustrates the contemporaneous
impacts of taxes on inﬂation. When regime is permanent Ricardian equivalence makes
taxes irrelevant, but taxes matter when regimes can change.
15Some readers might object that this result seems to be inconsistent with Canzoneri, Cumby,
and Diba’s (2001) proposition stating that if surpluses respond positively to debt inﬁnitely often–
however brieﬂy and weakly–then the equilibrium is Ricardian. But the relevance of the suﬃcient
conditions in the proposition can be questioned. The proposition presupposes that debt can grow
without bound and not lead to non-Ricardian policy. But this necessarily implies that taxes, which
are proportional to debt, also must grow without bound. In our model, or any model with distorting
taxes, this cannot happen so the proposition does not apply [also see Cochrane (2001b)]. We thank
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Regime switching also increases the elasticity of real debt to policy disturbances
by propagating the shocks’ impacts and changing the present values of taxes and
seigniorage [right panels of ﬁgure 2]. For example, as ﬁgure 1 showed, a negative
shock to ψt raises the nominal interest rate and generates an expectation that both
direct and inﬂation taxes will rise in the future, supporting the increase in the current
value of debt. Of course, the higher value of debt is associated with a higher present
value of surpluses when the switching model conditions on staying in regime 1 where
γ1(1) = .275. Figure 3 shows the present values of both surpluses and seigniorage in
the switching and the ﬁxed-regime models.
If agents expect tax policy to be non-Ricardian in the future, the Taylor principle
may not be suﬃcient to oﬀset the inﬂationary impacts of tax disturbances. Indeed,
the Taylor principle is destabilizing because it gives i.i.d. tax shocks persistent eﬀects,
increasing the variances of demand and inﬂation.
4.4.2. Monetary Shocks. When regime 1 is ﬁxed, a transitory monetary policy shock
creates a one-time increase in inﬂation by the conventional mechanism of an increase
in liquidity. The Taylor principle ensures the nominal interest rate stays ﬁxed. A
decline in the value of debt is matched by a decline in the present value of surpluses,
guaranteeing that both wealth and future inﬂation taxes are constant.
Regime switching alters the eﬀects of a transitory monetary easing by expanding
liquidity and reducing wealth [ﬁgure 1]. Because agents anticipate policy will shift to
PM/AF, they no longer expect lower future taxes to match the decline in debt’s value;
wealth falls. Lower wealth attenuates the liquidity-induced expansion of demand.
Along with the expectation that ﬁscal policy will switch to exogenous taxes comes
the expectation of a discrete drop in the price level to revalue debt. The present value
of seigniorage and the current nominal interest rate fall accordingly. Lower ﬁnancial
wealth at the beginning of next period, with no new injections of liquidity, reduces
inﬂation in that and subsequent periods.
Note that the monetary shock generates a small “price puzzle”: a monetary easing
that lowers the nominal interest rate is followed by lower future inﬂation. As we
see below, this pattern emerges because agents perceive there is a chance policy will
change to regime 2 in the future.
When prevailing policies combine AM and PF, tax disturbances produce a negative
correlation between money growth and inﬂation, and a positive correlation between
nominal debt creation and inﬂation. Monetary policy shocks make money growth
and inﬂation positively correlated, but bond growth and inﬂation are negatively cor-
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4.5. Impacts of Policy Shocks in Regime 2 (PM/AF). Regime 2 policy behav-
ior corresponds to the standard FTPL exercise: both taxes and the nominal interest
rate are exogenous. The policies also satisfy the hypotheses of Sargent and Wallace
(1981) with the obvious, but crucial, exception that government debt is nominal in
this model, but indexed in Sargent and Wallace’s.
4.5.1. Tax Shocks. A permanent regime 2 is the canonical FTPL exercise. Fixed
future taxes and constant current and future interest rates mean that a tax cut
cannot be ﬁnanced by future revenues. At initial interest rates and prices, agents
feel wealthier and try to increase their consumption paths. This increase in demand
drives up the current price level until the value of debt is returned to its original level
and agents are happy with their initial consumption plans. By ﬁxing the interest
rate, monetary policy prevents the tax shock from propagating.
Regime switching does not alter the ﬁxed-regime results [ﬁgure 5]. The current
inﬂation rate jumps to devalue the newly issued nominal debt; on the margin, the
full tax cut is ﬁnanced by contemporaneous surprise inﬂation taxes. An unchanged
value of debt is consistent with unchanged present values of taxes and seigniorage.
Money growth reacts passively to the higher price level to ensure the money market
clears at the ﬁxed nominal interest rate. These eﬀects coincide with those under
a ﬁxed PM/AF regime because even though agents impute a positive probability
to a Ricardian tax rule and a Taylor rule in the future, unchanged real debt and
an unchanged present value of surpluses are consistent with such a switch in rules.
Indeed, the decision rules as a function of ψt are identical [ﬁgure 6].
4.5.2. Monetary Shocks. When regime 2 is ﬁxed, a monetary policy shock at time
t lowers the nominal interest rate and induces oﬀsetting portfolio substitutions by
agents out of debt and into money. With their budget sets unperturbed by the shock,
there is no change in aggregate demand or inﬂation initially. The lower nominal rate
creates an expectation of lower future inﬂation and, therefore, seigniorage revenues
(supporting the drop in the value of debt). How is the lower expected inﬂation
realized? Although changes in real balances and real debt oﬀset each other, the drop
in Rt makes ﬁnancial wealth, wt, lower at the beginning of period t+1. This reduces
demand and inﬂa t i o ni nt h a tp e r i o d .
When regime can switch, surprise monetary easing produces a similar pattern of
impacts. The only diﬀerence is the small contemporaneous uptick in inﬂation [ﬁgure
5], which arises because agents impute a positive probability to switching to regime
1 (AM/PF), where expansionary monetary policy raises inﬂation.
With monetary policy in this model couched in terms of an interest rate rule,
the expansionary monetary shock produces a sizeable “price puzzle.” As we explorePOLICY SWITCHING 16
in section 7, this pattern of correlation oﬀers an explanation for the “price puzzle”
ﬁndings in the monetary VAR literature.
In regime 2, tax shocks make inﬂation positively correlated with both money growth
and bond growth. As in regime 1, monetary policy disturbances create a positive
correlation between money and inﬂation and a negative correlation between debt and
inﬂation.
5. Exploring the Parameter Space
This section characterizes the implications of alternative parameter settings across
two important dimensions of the parameter space. First we show in regime 1 (AM/PF)
the implications of the expected duration of each regime as reﬂected by the transition
matrix. The benchmark settings for the PM/AF regime assume the monetary author-
ity sets interest rates independently of inﬂation, implying tax reductions are ﬁnanced
entirely by a contemporaneous inﬂation tax (as in the FTPL). The implications for
the dynamic responses to tax shocks when interest rate policy responds positively,
but passively, to inﬂation are the second dimension we explore.
5.1. An Active Monetary/Passive Fiscal Regime. As section 4 demonstrated,
agents’ expectations that regime will switch in the future play a crucial role in deter-
mining the impacts of policy disturbances. The benchmark speciﬁcation assumes that
both regimes are relatively persistent. Here we explore how regime duration aﬀects
the result that tax cuts generate wealth eﬀects in regime 1. The expected duration
of a regime is given by




for j = {1,2} and dj = T − t,w h e r eSt = St+1 = ···= St+T = j and St+T+1 6= j.
By relatively persistent we mean that p11 >. 5 and p22 >. 5. These restrictions create
the expectation that regimes will be in place for more than two periods, making it
reasonable to interpret impulse responses that condition on staying in a particular
regime for several periods.
T h ed e g r e et ow h i c ht a xs h o c k sa ﬀect inﬂa t i o ni na nA M / P Fr e g i m ed e p e n d so n
the transition matrix. Figure 7 illustrates how the magnitude of the impact of a
tax cut on inﬂation increases as p11 → 0 and p22 → 1. Each decision rule represents
diﬀerent probabilities in the transition matrix, where
λ =
E [d1|St =1 ]
E [d1|St =1 ]+E [d2|St =2 ]
represents the proportion of time spent in the AM/PF regime. As the expected
proportion of time spent in the PM/AF regime increases, the inﬂation eﬀects of taxPOLICY SWITCHING 17
disturbances increase because agents expect to switch to the PM/AF regime in the
future and then remain there relatively longer than in the AM/PF regime.
As ﬁgure 8 illustrates, the transition matrix aﬀects the elasticity of inﬂation with
respect to a tax cut. The paths for inﬂation condition on the AM/PF regime and use
that regime’s steady state as the baseline; the tax cut occurs in period 2. As agents
expect to spend relatively more time in the PM/AF regime, a tax cut generates
a larger increase in inﬂation on impact and results in higher variance of inﬂation.
The larger increase on impact arises from the expectation of a regime change to a
more persistent PM/AF regime in the near future. Consequently, agents expect to
remain in the AM/PF regime for relatively fewer periods, creating a lower expected
present value of direct taxes relative to a scenario where the AM/PF regime is highly
persistent. Thus, the expected regime change, which would result in a discrete jump
in the price level, generates expectations of higher inﬂation relative to where agents
expect to remain in the AM/PF regime for several periods.
5.2. A Passive Monetary/Active Fiscal Regime. In the ﬁxed-regime model, a
tax shock moves the price level and revalues outstanding nominal debt so the value
of real debt matches the discounted value of future surpluses and seigniorage. With
exogenous taxes and a pegged interest rate, the revaluation of nominal debt following
an i.i.d. shock to taxes occurs instantaneously. But when regime is ﬁxed, transitory
tax shocks can generate serially correlated changes in inﬂation if the monetary au-
thority responds weakly to inﬂation (α1 > 0). This prevents the complete devaluation
of nominal debt from occurring in the period of the tax shock. Instead, a tax cut is
ﬁnanced by issuing debt that will be repaid with inﬂation taxes spread over several
future periods.
As α increases, the monetary authority responds more aggressively to inﬂation and
the tax cut causes a larger increase in the interest rate and a smaller contemporaneous
rise in inﬂation. The higher interest rate, along with a higher real value of debt (due
to the lower contemporaneous inﬂation tax), induces substitution from real balances
to bonds. As α increases, so must the present value of seigniorage following a tax cut.
However, regardless of the value of α1 in the ﬁxed-regime model, the persistence in
inﬂation is quite weak, as the present value of future seigniorage returns to its initial
level relatively quickly. These eﬀects are illustrated in ﬁgure 9 for a tax cut in period
2.
In the switching model, the positive probability of regime change propagates in-
ﬂation to a much greater degree relative to the ﬁxed-regime model [ﬁgure 10]. With
α1(2) > 0, debt rises in response to a tax cut in period 2 because agents expect future
primary surpluses and seigniorage to adjust in the future. Agents impute positive
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be repaid with higher taxes. This generates a negative wealth eﬀect, reducing ag-
g r e g a t ed e m a n da n dl o w e r i n gt h er a t eo fi n ﬂation relative to the ﬁxed regime model.
These eﬀects are in place until the policy regime changes. With the lower inﬂation
rate generating less revenue in any given period, the inﬂation taxes are spread over
more periods than in the ﬁxed regime model.
6. Explosive Policies
This section considers a regime where both the monetary and ﬁscal authorities
behave actively, implying that both authorities set policy unconstrained by concerns
about the state of government debt. An AM/AF policy implies that debt is “locally
explosive,” referring to the behavior of debt within a particular regime. If alternative
regimes exist where one policy authority generates revenue passively to satisfy the
present value identity, then a locally explosive regime does not necessarily imply a
globally explosive path for real debt. Francq and Zakoian (2001) and Davig (2003a)
derive restrictions ensuring global stability for Markov-switching processes with lo-
cally explosive regimes. In general, the restrictions involve a trade-oﬀ between the
rate of growth in the explosive regime and the expected duration of remaining in each
regime.16 As the expected duration of a locally explosive regime increases, the rate
of growth must decline to ensure global stability.
To illustrate the eﬀects of explosive policies, the benchmark parameter settings
are changed. The monetary authority always responds actively to inﬂation, α1(1) =
α1(2) = 1.5. The ﬁscal authority behaves as in the benchmark, where γ1(1) = .275
and γ1(2) = 0,e x c e p tγ0(2) is set so that taxes are 3 percent (of output) lower on
average than in the AM/AF regime. The transition matrix is also adjusted so the
expected duration of the explosive regime is 4 years and is 10 years for the AM/PF
regime.
U n d e ra nA M / P Fa n dA M / A Fs p e c i ﬁcation, ﬁgure 11 illustrates the eﬀects of a
4-year switch to an AM/AF regime from an AM/PF regime. The ﬁgure also shows a
switch back to the AM/PF regime at period 8. The switch from AM/PF to AM/AF
causes taxes to fall and then no longer respond to debt. The monetary authority
refuses to allow inﬂation to revalue the increase in debt and thus, the combination
of policies result in a temporarily explosive path for real debt. Agents continue to
16This characterization of the restrictions ensuring global stability is a simpliﬁcation designed to
highlight the restrictions with a model where the regimes are persistent. In general, a dynamic model
with all locally stationary regimes is neither necessary or suﬃcient for global stability. Francq and
Zakoian (2001) provide an example where the local stationarity of all regimes does not imply global
stationarity. Using an AR(2) process where the series increases when switching occurs, a transition
matrix resulting in frequent regime changes results in a globally explosive process.POLICY SWITCHING 19
purchase and hold debt, however, because they anticipate a change to a regime that
raises taxes to service and pay oﬀ the debt.
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7. Some Empirical Implications
This section derives twoempirical implications fromthe theoretical regime-switching
environment. The implications are demonstrated using time series produced by sim-
ulating the benchmark model for 100,000 periods. The simulation allows regime to
evolve according to the transition probabilities in (12) and draws (θt,ψt) from their
normal distributions.
7.1. The “Price Puzzle”. The “price puzzle” that emerges from many attempts to
identify exogenous shifts in monetary policy is well documented [for example, Sims
(1992), Eichenbaum (1992), Hanson (2002)]. It was regarded as a puzzle because a
monetary expansion that lowers the nominal interest rate is often followed by lower
inﬂation, rather than higher inﬂation, as many theories would predict. Several papers
try to resolve the puzzle by changing identifying assumptions or by expanding the
information set on which policy choices are based [for example, Gordon and Leeper
(1994), Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999),
Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2002), Leeper and Roush (2003)].
Another reaction has been that lower inﬂation following a lower interest rate is not
a puzzle at all. To the extent that ﬁrms must borrow to ﬁnance wage bills and new
investment, lower interest rates reduce the costs of production and can lead naturally
to lower inﬂation, at least for some period [Barth and Ramey (2001), Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001)].
As suggested in section 4, a positive correlation between the interest rate and future
inﬂation is also a natural outcome of the switching model. It appears subtly under
regime 1 (AM/PF) and forcefully under regime 2 (PM/AF). We now show that if
time series data were generated by this setup, one should expect to ﬁnd that positive
interest rates innovations predict higher inﬂation.
Figure 12 shows the responses of inﬂation and the nominal interest rate to an
orthogonalized innovation in the nominal rate. Ordering inﬂation before the interest
rate is consistent with much of the VAR work, which treats inﬂation as predetermined,
and is also consistent with estimates of the Taylor rule, which regress the nominal
rate on inﬂation (and potentially other variables). Although the policy disturbances
are i.i.d. and the monetary policy rule is purely contemporaneous, the interest rate
17These results are similar to Woodford (1998), who conducts the same experiment with Ricardian
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displays substantial serial correlation. Inﬂation rises sharply in the short run, and
remains above its initial level for 10 periods.
The model’s results are consistent with the Hanson’s (2002) careful analysis. He
ﬁnds that the “price puzzle” cannot be solved by the conventional method of adding
commodity prices to the Fed’s information set. And more to the point for the present
work, Hanson ﬁnds that the “puzzle” is more pronounced in the period 1960-1979. But
Favero and Monacelli (2003) identify that period as one where monetary policy was
passive and ﬁscal policy was active. As ﬁgure 5 shows, the model predicts precisely
this outcome when conditioning on PM/AF.
7.2. Surplus-Debt Regressions. A number of authors have computed regressions
of budget surpluses and government debt to draw inferences about the source of ﬁscal
ﬁnancing [for example, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001), Bohn (1998), Janssen,
Nolan, and Thomas (2001)]. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (CCD), for example,
estimate a bivariate VAR with the government surplus and total liabilities.18 Their
ﬁgure 3 reports that a positive innovation in the surplus is followed by persistently
lower liabilities and a surplus that is signiﬁcantly positive for only two periods. They
argue that a Ricardian interpretation of the data is “more plausible” than is a non-
Ricardian one, as the increase in the surplus is used to retire debt.
Simulated data from the regime-switching model produce a pattern of correlation
strikingly similar to the top panel of CCD’s ﬁgure 3. A positive innovation to the
surplus produces an immediate and persistent decline in liabilities [ﬁgure 13].
19 Of
course, as ﬁgure 1 makes clear, even conditional on current tax policy being Ricardian,
tax shocks always generate wealth eﬀects and non-Ricardian outcomes.
Our setup is completely straightforward and plausible. Both a reading of Amer-
ican tax history over CCD’s sample period and the corroborating formal statistical
evidence that Favero and Monacelli (2003) present support the view that monetary
and ﬁscal policy regimes have switched in a manner that our setup aims to capture.
8. Concluding Remarks
In most countries monetary and ﬁscal authorities cannot credibly commit to always
follow either active monetary policy and passive ﬁscal policy or passive monetary pol-
icy and active ﬁscal policy. If as a consequence, private agents place probability mass
on both kinds of regimes, then something like the regime-switching environment that
18The surpluses is deﬁned to include seigniorage and total liabilities are the sum of net government
debt and the monetary base.
19Given the paucity of independent disturbances in the model and the simple form of the tax rule,
which excludes any contemporaneous response to other variables, in the reverse Choleski ordering–
liabilities, surplus–an orthogonalized innovation to the surplus has no predictive value for liabilities.POLICY SWITCHING 21
we model will apply. That environment makes wealth eﬀects–from both monetary
and tax policy disturbances–important for determining the impacts of policy.
The implications of this switching setup raise some doubts about two pillars of
recent policy analysis. First, because tax changes have wealth eﬀects, even if the
prevailing regime combines the Taylor principle for monetary policy with taxes that
respond strongly to debt, Ricardian equivalence may be a misleading benchmark. Sec-
ond, the Taylor principle can actually be destabilizing in the sense that it propagates
disturbances and can increase t h ev a r i a n c eo fa g g r e g a t ed e m a n da n di n ﬂation.
There are at least two dimensions along which to extend the current framework.
Is it possible for both policy authorities to act passively in one regime, yet have the
price level uniquely determined? It is not clear whether the current computational
approach can deliver and appropriately characterize a solution with multiple equilibria
or sunspots, as Lubik and Schorfheide (2003a) have done for linear models. The
second extension addresses the question: how “big” are the ﬁscal eﬀects when the
current regime is AM/PF? To address this, we need a carefully calibrated model with
frictions, possibly of the kind in the workhorse New Keynesian model extended to
include long-term government debt as in Cochrane (2001a). With such a model in
hand, we could extract a more complete set of empirical implications. In the New
Keynesian model monetary policy has more conventional macro eﬀects, in addition
to the ﬁscal ﬁnancing eﬀects this paper analyzes.POLICY SWITCHING 22
Appendix A. Why Linear Methods Fail
This appendix examines the suitability of various linearization approaches to solving the regime-switching
model. Our conclusion is that none of these linearization approaches can be expected to give an accurate
characterization of the stability of the full non-linear system in all of the cases of interest to us. This
conclusion is somewhat surprising, given the nearly linear dynamics of the full system. Essentially, linearized
models miss the role of the endogenous expectation error in determining the long-run behavior of the system.
Since the qualitative properties of the dynamics are determined by the system’s long-run behavior, these
linearized models fail to present an accurate picture of it. In particular, they may fail to classify existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium correctly.
To get an intuitive sense of the problem with linearized models, consider ﬁrst a straightforward lineariza-
tion around a deterministic steady-state associated with one of the regimes. For the next few paragraphs,
we will work with a simpliﬁed version of the model, in which seigniorage is identically zero. The government




− γ1tbt−1 + g − γ0t − ψt, (17)
where (γ0t,γ1t) denote the regime-dependent parameters of the tax rule, (γ0(St ),γ1(St )).







. Using this deﬁnition and the Fisher equation, the







bt−1 + g − γ0t − ψt. (18)







∆bt−1 + g − ∆γ0t − ψt +
b
β
∆ηt − b∆γ1t, (19)
where ∆b ≡ bt − b,a n db is the steady-state value of real bonds under one of the regimes.
In the single-regime version of the model, the expectation error is i.i.d. and, therefore, the linearized ver-
sion accurately captures the stability properties of the model. (See end of appendix C for proof.) However,
in the full non-linear regime-switching model, the expectation errors ηt are correlated with future γ1. Con-








in general, the long-run properties of the linearized model will be diﬀerent from those of the full non-linear
model, as the long-run behavior is governed by the expected value of such products.
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Now consider an alternative linearization approach. Since the equilibrium policy functions in this model
appear to be nearly linear, one might imagine that a state-contingent linearization approach would be
successful in reproducing the long-run properties of the full system. In this case, at each date we linearize












20This possibility precludes using many of the standard second-order accurate expansions available in the literature.
Typically, it is an assumption of these methods that the ﬁrst-order linearization accurately determines the long-run behavior
of the system and this assumption is not necessarily satisﬁed for our model [Kim, Kim, Schaumberg, and Sims (2003),
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Again, the problem will be that, when η is signiﬁcant, the long-run dynamics of the random-coeﬃcient
models may fail to represent the stability properties of the full system.
To get a sense of the importance of this possibility, we can compare the results of the linearized models to
the full non-linear model for special parameter values for which it is possible to solve the full model exactly.
Suppose that monetary policy obeys the rule Rt =e x p ( α0t + α1tπ1t + θt). Using the Fisher equation, and
using the deﬁnition of the endogenous expectation error, the dynamics for inﬂation can be written as
b πt+1 = α1tb πt + θt + α0t +l nβ − b ηt+1,
where ˆ denotes the natural log of the variable.
In appendix B, we show how to determine some long-run properties of this diﬀerence equation. For certain
parameter values it will turn out that imposing stability on the inﬂa t i o np r o c e s si ss u ﬃcient to determine
the mapping between inﬂation and the exogenous shocks. These are the determinate Ricardian equilibria of
this model. Having solved for π, we can then obtain an expression for the endogenous expectation error η.







bt−1 + Υt,t−1, (21)
where Υt,t−1 ≡
mt−1
πt − mt + gt − ψt. The solution for π implies that inﬂation depends only on the current
regime St and realization of θ. Therefore, Υt depends only on current and lagged θt and St . Appendix C
shows that the stability of this equation can be determined because η is known.
In Ricardian equilibria, we can compare the results of the full non-linear model with those of the straight-
forward linearization around a single steady state. Results are predictably poor and we will not describe
them in detail. More interestingly, we can also compare the random-coeﬃcients linearization with the full
model. With the random-coeﬃcients model, however, the only qualitative diﬀerence between the two models
arises in results concerning the stability of the government budget identity: the random-coeﬃcients model
may suggest stability when the full model is not stable and vice-versa.
As a baseline, consider the model with γ1(1) = .275 and γ1(2) = 0, p11 = p22 = .99, α0(1) = −.5,
α0(2) = .5. With this setting, the two linearization schemes report that the bond dynamics are stable if
inﬂation dynamics are. However, such is not the case in the non-linear system. Figures 14-16 report the
results of varying α1 systematically between 1 and 5. The lightly-shaded areas represent regions identiﬁed as
Ricardian by both linear methods and by the exact solution to the full system. Areas shaded in the middle
tone are regions of the parameter space which do not support an equilibrium in the full system, but which
are equilibria for the linearized system. Finally, dark regions are areas that, according to the non-linear
model, lie outside of the Ricardian space, including non-Ricardian and indeterminate equilibria.
As is apparent from ﬁgure 14, with the baseline settings there is a substantial region in which the linearized
methods fail to capture the long-run behavior of the system, even though the dynamics conditional on regime
are nearly linear. Intuitively, these results arise because the regimes are long-lived, while inﬂation behavior
may diﬀer substantially across regimes. Say, for example, that inﬂa t i o ni sm u c hh i g h e ri nr e g i m e1t h a ni n
2. Then, while the system switches from 1 to 2, the inﬂation rate falls dramatically, generating a large value
for η. Moreover, while in regime 2, the inﬂation rate is persistently and substantially below expectations.
T h eg r o w t hr a t eo fd e b ti st h e r e f o r eh i g h e rt h a nt h ee xa n t er e a li n t e r e s tr a t e ,a tt h es a m et i m et h a tt a x e s
fail to respond to lagged debt. The ultimate eﬀect is that the growth rate of debt is explosive, while the
linear model, which does not capture these correlations, suggests that debt is stable.
To gauge the sensitivity of the model to these eﬀects, we varied several parameters of the baseline,
including the persistence of the regimes, the standard deviations of the shocks and the intercept terms in the
monetary policy rule.21 Results of these variations are presented in ﬁgures 15-16. Reducing the persistence ofPOLICY SWITCHING 24
the regimes leads to smaller diﬀerences in inﬂation behavior between regimes. Correspondingly, the forecast
errors, on average, are not as large, while also not as informative about future tax policy. Linear methods
then are quite successful in tracking the long-term behavior of the system, as shown in ﬁgure 15, which
increases the transition probability to 70%. Increasing the gap between the intercepts in the two regimes
increases the spread in inﬂation rates across regimes and for similar reasons the performance of linear models
becomes commensurately poor. (Figure 16 presents results from a run with the intercepts set at 1 and -1.
The region of the parameter space over which the linear model mis-characterizes the long-run behavior of
the model is much larger than the corresponding region for the baseline.)
Nevertheless, given our wish to explore the parameter space over fairly broad regions and with relatively
persistent regimes, the linearized models are clearly not suitable. With widely separated, persistent regimes,
the expected growth rate of debt is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by much lower-than-expected (or higher-than-
expected) inﬂation. Neither of the linearization approaches matches this feature of the full model, and so
cannot match its dynamics in general.
Appendix B. Stability Properties of Random-Coefficient Linear Models
For our purposes, it is suﬃcient to consider the stability properties of a simple univariate model of the
following form:
xt = αt−1(St−1)xt−1 + ξt−1 + Π(St)ηt,
where αt follows an M-state Markov chain, ξt is an exogenous shock process possibly depending on both the
state of the Markov chain and on Q additional i.i.d. processes Θ and ηt is an endogenous expectation error,
satisfying the constraint Etηt+1 =0 . Let the transition matrix of the Markov chain be given by π,w h e r e
πij = prob(st+1 = i|st = j). Finally, the expectation Et is taken with respect to the time t information set
{xt−j,S t−j,ξ t−j,ζt−j|j ≥ 0},w h e r eζ represents a non-fundamental (“sunspot”) shock.




































a(k) · prob(St+1 = l|St = k).

























t |•)Γ. Accordingly, Et(a
(l)
t |•)=ωΓ
(l),w h e r eω is a 1xM vector of ones.
From this relation, it follows that for j> 1,
21Altering the variance of the i.i.d. shock does not have a very dramatic impact on the performance of the linear model.






prob(St+j−2 = n|St = m) ·
M X
k=1













where µij ≡ Et+j−2(ξt+j−1|St+j−1 = i,St+j−2 = j) · prob(St+j−1 = i|St+j−2 = j).
For j =1 , Et(a
(l)
t+1ξt|St = m)=ξtωΓlπ.
Finally, the endogenous expectation errors can be handled as follows. Consider terms of the form d(St)ηt.
Then deﬁne the basis random variables χj(St) associated with the Markov state St, which are deﬁned so
that χj(St)=1if St = j and 0 otherwise.








where ε is uncorrelated with the χj and Θ.N o t et h a tEta
(l)
t+j|St = m is measurable with respect to St,s o










l=1blΘl. Ultimately, therefore, we can treat the expectation errors
just as we treat the ξ, since any dependence on the sunspot shocks ζ drops out of the expectations of interest.















where X = diag(x(1)...x(M)).





























Therefore, the long-run expected properties of x are characterized by the number of explosive roots of Γ.
Appendix C. Solving a Ricardian Model
From the Fisher equation and the monetary policy rule, we have that 1/Rt = βEt1/πt+1 =e x p ( −α1tπt−
α0t − θt),w h e r eθt is i.i.d. Deﬁning ηt+1 =
1/πt+1
Et1/πt+1 , we can rewrite these equations in logs as b πt+1 =
α1tb πt +θt +α0t +lnβ −b ηt+1. In this case, b η is not mean-zero, as is apparent from its deﬁnition. Therefore,
we decompose b η into its mean and deviations from the mean: b ηt+1 = e ηt+1 + Etb ηt+1. Because the monetary
policy shockis i.i.d., the mean ispurely dependent on the MarkovstateSt.F r o mh e r eo n ,l e tνt(St)=Etb ηt+1.POLICY SWITCHING 26
W r i t t e ni nt h i sf o r m ,i n ﬂation dynamics are of the form described in Appendix B, and, therefore, stability


















where we have dropped the intercept term from the expression for the sake of convenience. The intercept
contains νt, which must be determined later. In any event, the contribution of the intercept only adds a
purely St dependent term to the expression for x(St).







































































Γ(A) · X · π















+( 1− 1/α1(1),1 − 1/α1(2))θt =0
Finally, after some further algebra with this expression, we can obtain explicit solutions for the inﬂation
function. In this case, the inﬂation function is very simple: x(St)=−θt/α1(St).
With the intercept term, we would have obtained x(St)=−θt/α1(St)+ ∆(St),w h e r e∆(St) depends on
the still-undetermined Etb ηt+1. This term can be determined by imposing the condition that Etηt+1 =1 .
Substituting the result for x(St),w eh a v e


































This condition, for each initial St, is suﬃcient to determine ∆(St).POLICY SWITCHING 27
Once the expectations errors η have been determined, the long-run properties of the bond dynamics can
be derived using a variation of the methods in Appendix B. When steady-state inﬂation rates are diﬀerent

































=( 1 /β − γ1)
k.
This result holds when the conditional mean of γ1 is independent of the initial state. Thus, under these
circumstances, the state-contingent linearization scheme will perfectly capture the long-run behavior of the
full non-linear system.
Appendix D. Solving the Non-linear Regime-Switching Model
The complete model consists of a system of non-linear expectational diﬀerence equations composed of
the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions from the representative agent’s optimization problem, constraints, spec-
iﬁcation of the policy process, and the transversality conditions on real balances and bonds. The solution
method, based on Coleman (1991), conjectures candidate decision rules that reduce the system to a set of
non-linear expectational ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations. The solution consists of two functions that yield
values for real debt and inﬂation given the state.
The decision rule for real debt and the pricing function for inﬂation are found by substituting the con-
jectured rules into the complete model, represented by
Rt = α0(St)+α1(St)h
π (Φt)+θt, (22)









t = βEt [h
π (Φt+1)] (25)
h
b (Φt)+mt + τt = g + wt−1 (h
π (Φt))
−1 (26)
where the future state, Φt+1,i s
Φt+1 =
©
wt,b t,θ t+1,ψ t+1,S t+1
ª
,
where wt = Rtbt + mt.
Substituting (22) − (24) into (25) − (26) and using numerical quadrature to evaluate the triple integral
representing expected inﬂation reduces the system to two equations in two unknowns, πt and bt.T h es y s t e m
is solved for every set of state variables deﬁned over a discrete partition of the state space, yielding updated
approximations to h
π (Φt) and h
b (Φt) at every point in the state space. When evaluating the integral,
non-linear interpolation is used to compute inﬂation for states that lie oﬀ the discretized state grid. This
procedure is repeated until iterations update the current decision rule at any given state vector by less than
some  >0.
The solution is veriﬁed using three criteria i) residuals for the government budget identity and ﬁrst order
conditions are less than some   ii) the diﬀerence between an approximation of the sum of the present value of
primary surpluses and seigniorage is less than some   and iii) the unconditional mean of expectational errorsPOLICY SWITCHING 28
are zero in random simulations. We verify suﬃcient conditions by observing the solution implies stationary
paths for real debt and real balances. The solution is veriﬁed to be locally unique by randomly perturbing
the converged rule and verifying that it converges back to the initial rule.POLICY SWITCHING 29
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Figure 1. Impacts of Policy Shocks Conditional on Regime 1 (AM/FP)POLICY SWITCHING 35






















































































θ = .0018 
σ 
ψ = .0045 
Figure 2. Regime 1 (AM/PF): Decision Rules in Switching- and
Fixed-Regime ModelsPOLICY SWITCHING 36








































Figure 3. Regime 1 (AM/PF): Responses of Present Values of Sur-
pluses and Seigniorage to a Tax Cut in Period 2 in Switching- and
Fixed-Regime Models



















Figure 4. Regime 1 (AM/PF): Sensitivity of Inﬂation to Total Real
Wealth, w = Rb + mPOLICY SWITCHING 37



































































































Figure 5. Impacts of Policy Shocks Conditional on Regime 2 (PM/AF)POLICY SWITCHING 38





















































































Figure 6. Regime 2 (PM/AF): Decision Rules in Switching- and
Fixed-Regime ModelsPOLICY SWITCHING 39





















Figure 7. Regime 1 (AM/PF): Contemporaneous Impact of Taxes on
Inﬂation as p11 → 0 and p22 → 1


















Figure 8. Regime 1 (AM/PF): Response of Inﬂation to Tax Cut in
Period 2 as a Function of λ, Proportion of Time Spent in Regime 1.POLICY SWITCHING 40


































Figure 9. Fixed Regime (PM/AF): Response of Present Value of
Seigniorage to Tax Cut in Period 2 as a Function of the Monetary
Policy Response of the Interest Rate to InﬂationPOLICY SWITCHING 41


































Figure 10. R e g i m e2( P M / A F ) :R e s p o n s eo fP r e s e n tV a l u eo f
Seigniorage to Tax Cut in Period 2 as a Function of the Monetary


































































Figure 11. Time Paths When Regime 1 is AM/PF and Regime 2 is AM/AFPOLICY SWITCHING 42














Figure 12. Responses to a Nominal Interest Rate Innovation: Using
Data Simulated from Regime-Switching Model




































Figure 13. R e s p o n s e st oaS u r p l u sI n n o v a t i o n :U s i n gD a t aS i m u l a t e d
from Regime-Switching ModelPOLICY SWITCHING 43
Figure 14. Light shading: linear methods and nonlinear model agree;
middle shading: linear methods imply existence, nonlinear model
implies nonexistence; dark shading: nonlinear model implies non-
Ricardian ﬁscal policy or indeterminacy.
Figure 15. Light shading: linear methods and nonlinear model agree;
middle shading: linear methods imply existence, nonlinear model
implies nonexistence; dark shading: nonlinear model implies non-
Ricardian ﬁscal policy or indeterminacy.POLICY SWITCHING 44
Figure 16. Light shading: linear methods and nonlinear model agree;
middle shading: linear methods imply existence, nonlinear model
implies nonexistence; dark shading: nonlinear model implies non-
Ricardian ﬁscal policy or indeterminacy.